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On the Hidden Side of Liquidity 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
An important number of stock exchanges allow market participants to enter limit 
orders without revealing the full size. However, there is a lot of controversy over the 
use and consequences of hidden orders, since they embrace a complex interaction 
between order exposure risk, market liquidity and transparency. Our study focuses 
on the motives of submitting undisclosed limit orders to trade as well as on the 
market response when the presence of these orders is publicly revealed. Using data 
from the Spanish Stock Exchange, we find that hidden orders emerge in periods of 
intense trading activity and extremely high liquidity. Our results find no evidence 
that the undisclosed volume is used as a defensive strategy against parasitic traders. 
On the contrary, we provide support to the notion that liquidity suppliers use hidden 
orders to mitigate adverse selection costs. We also report that hidden orders 
temporally increase the aggressiveness of traders when they are revealed to the 
marketplace but, as opposed to the widespread opinion among practitioners, they 
have no relevant price impact. 
 
JEL: G1  
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1. Introduction 
“Pure” order driven markets are characterized by the absence of market makers. These 
markets rely upon limit orders to replace market makers for the provision of liquidity. Until 
recently, the empirical evidence about limit-order trading focused on the limit order book of 
the NYSE, which complements the liquidity provided by the specialist (e.g., Kavajecz, 1999). 
However, the patent trend in market design toward electronic limit order book systems (see 
Domowitz and Wang, 1994) together with the increasing availability of order book data have 
yielded a growing interest on the liquidity provision in “pure” order driven markets.  
Empirical research has highlighted the capability of pure order driven venues to provide 
liquidity when it is valuable for the marketplace.1 Several studies have compared electronic 
limit order books with other market structures, reporting a good relative performance in terms 
of liquidity.2 Although these papers suggest that limit order traders substitute market makers 
fairly well in providing immediacy and depth to the market, there may be significant 
differences in terms of permanence and visibility. First, market makers are forced to 
continuously posting bid and ask quotes whilst limit order traders are not required to be 
always providing liquidity and have the freedom to choose whether to submit limit orders to 
buy or to sell. In this regard, Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) evidence that an important 
proportion of limit orders submitted to the Island ECN are cancelled between two seconds of 
their submission. Second, order-driven markets usually provide facilities that allow traders to 
submit (partially) undisclosed limit orders, also known as iceberg orders or hidden orders. By 
submitting an iceberg order, the trader only displays a fraction of the total quantity she wishes 
to buy or sell. Hence, investors do not necessarily know the exact quantity of shares offered or 
demanded at the posted quotes.  
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Some recent studies provide evidence about the usage of iceberg orders. Degryse (1999) 
estimates that hidden orders account for about 16% of the entire limit order book of the 
Brussels CATS system. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) report that almost 12% of all order 
executions and executed shares of the Island ECN involve hidden orders. D’Hondt, De Winne 
and François-Heude (2001) obtain that iceberg orders represent 14% of limit orders and 45% 
of the shares offered or demanded of the Paris Euro-NM. Tuttle (2002) obtains that hidden 
liquidity accounts for 22% of the inside depth in a sample of Nasdaq stocks after the Super 
SOES implementation. Finally, D’Hondt et al. (2003) report that half of the depth available in 
the five best levels of the Euronext is undisclosed. Up to date, however, very little is known 
about the motives and consequences of submitting undisclosed orders. In fact, there is a lot of 
controversy among market regulators over the possibility to partially hide the size of the 
orders, since it creates a real trade-off between two desirable features for any market: 
transparency and liquidity. We have conducted a small informal survey of ten Spanish fund 
managers and financial services traders. All of them agree that iceberg orders involve large-
sized orders. Practitioners argue that iceberg orders are used to avoid unfavorable price 
movements, obscuring the trading strategy of large investors and/or preventing from being 
front-run. However, there is no consensus concerning when and for what stocks iceberg order 
placement is more likely. Moreover, practitioners disagree regarding the market response 
when hidden volume is detected. 
In this paper, we cope with hidden orders in a continuous electronic pure order-driven 
market: the Stock Exchange Interconnection System (henceforth SIBE) of the Spanish Stock 
Exchange (SSE). We use six months of limit order book and transaction data on the 36 SSE-
listed stocks with the highest activity rates and liquidity levels during the year 2000. We 
identify all market or marketable limit orders that picked off hidden limit orders, and we use 
this information to accomplish two goals: firstly, we study the effective contribution of hidden 
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limit orders to the trading process; namely, we analyze the probability of an order being 
executed against an iceberg order conditional on different information sets: the trading hour, 
the state of the limit order book and the information intensity. We evidence that hidden 
volume concentrates towards the end of the trading session, when the NYSE and the SSE 
sessions overlap, a period of intense trading activity and extremely high liquidity. Our 
findings strongly support the hypothesis that liquidity suppliers use hidden orders to mitigate 
adverse selection costs. In contrast, our findings do not support the hypothesis that hidden 
orders are used as a mechanism to reduce the option value of limit orders for parasitic traders. 
Secondly, we investigate the market response when hidden volume is exposed to all 
traders; namely, we evaluate the information content of iceberg orders by studying its impact 
on the stock returns and volatility. We also examine the incidence of iceberg orders detection 
on trader’s strategies by analyzing its impact on the composition of the order flow. Our results 
suggest that hidden orders have no relevant price impact but they temporally increase the 
aggressiveness of traders when revealed to the marketplace. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons why limit order traders may 
choose not to display the whole size of their orders. Section 3 details the structure of the SIBE 
with special attention to hidden orders.  Section 4 describes the database and provides some 
statistics about the 36 stocks in the sample. Section 5 studies the probability of hitting iceberg 
orders depending on the trading hour. Section 6 analyzes the probability of hitting iceberg 
orders conditional on the limit order book and several proxies for information intensity. 
Section 7 evaluates the information content of iceberg orders. Finally, section 8 concludes.  
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2. The rationale for hidden order placement 
The desirability of hidden orders embraces a complex interaction between order exposure 
risk, market liquidity and transparency. In a pure order driven market, traders choose to 
submit either limit orders or market orders. This decision is relevant since market orders 
consume posted liquidity and limit orders supply liquidity. If a trade occurs, limit orders result 
in better execution prices than market orders. The inconvenience is that limit order traders run 
various risks.  
Firstly, the execution of a limit order is not guaranteed. Favorable (unfavorable) news can 
result in unexecuted limit orders to buy (sell), missing the investment opportunity. The time to 
execution may depend on many factors, like the limit price, the state of the limit order book, 
the market conditions, etc. Lo, MacKinlay and Zhang (2002) evidence that execution times of 
limit orders submitted are very sensitive to the limit price but not to the limit size. Parlour 
(1998), Foucault (1999), and Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) model the trader’s decision 
as to whether to place a limit order or a market order. These models suggest that variables like 
the imbalance between potential buyers and sellers and the volatility of the asset determine 
the non-execution risk of a limit order and, hence, the mix between market and limit orders. 
Consequently, the lower the non-execution risk, the higher the expected proportion of limit 
orders in total order flow. These models do not offer any theoretical prediction regarding the 
mix between disclosed and (partially) undisclosed limit orders. What is more, assuming that 
Lo et al.’s (2002) findings can be extended to other trading venues, reducing the time to 
execution should not be a reason for keeping in secret part of the order size. Nonetheless, 
intuition suggests that given a non-execution risk level, the probability of hidden order 
placement should increase with other exposure risks. Thus, whether to submit undisclosed or 
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disclosed limit orders emerges as a second stage decision after choosing between ordinary 
limit orders and market orders. 
Secondly, limit order traders face adverse selection costs. Because the limit price is fixed 
over time, limit orders can become mispriced when new public information arrives. This 
situation creates a winner’s curse problem for limit order traders since their orders are more 
likely to be executed (at a loss) when they become mispriced (Foucault, 1999). Copeland and 
Galai (1983) characterized limit orders to buy (sell) as free put (call) options for the entire 
market. When a limit order executes against an informed agent, it does it in the money. In 
Glosten’s (1994) model, limit order traders implicitly gain from liquidity driven price changes 
but lose from information driven price changes. Handa and Schwartz (1996) examine the 
profitability of limit order trading. In their model, the trader’s choice between limit and 
market orders depends on the probability of the limit order being executed against an 
informed trader since executing orders against permanent price changes is undesirable. Hence, 
this model predicts exposure costs to decrease with liquidity-driven volatility and to increase 
with information-driven volatility. In Foucault (1999), however, higher volatility arising from 
information causes limit order traders to set prices less aggressively, increasing the relative 
risk of market orders and the proportion of limit orders in the incoming order flow. 
In a recent empirical paper, Bae, Jang and Park (2003) decompose the price volatility in 
volatility arising from noise or liquidity trading and volatility arising from information to test 
the two competing predictions in Foucault’s and Handa and Schwartz’ models. They evidence 
that NYSE traders place more limit orders through SuperDot when the bid-ask spread is large 
and they expect high transitory price volatility. The impact of informational volatility is 
indeterminate, a finding that supports neither Foucault’s nor Handa and Schwartz’ arguments. 
These authors do not deal with undisclosed limit orders. However, our intuitive hypothesis is 
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that limit order traders prefer to submit partially undisclosed orders whenever the perceived 
risk of trading against informed traders is high.  
Since losses with informed traders would be increasing with the limit order size, iceberg 
orders are likely to be associated with large buyers and sellers that become less willing to 
display their trading. If informed traders only know the displayed depth available at prices 
where they can profitably trade, they may submit orders for fewer shares than they would if 
they could also see the hidden side of depth. In this manner, undisclosed order traders may 
reduce their adverse selection costs. Because news may always happen, there would be a 
strictly positive probability of hidden depth in the book, and the size of the hidden depth 
(relative to the displayed depth) would increase with the probability of such an event.3 
 Moreover, informed traders are usually characterized as impatient traders. Patient traders 
place limit orders and supply liquidity whereas the impatient ones place market orders and 
consume liquidity (e.g., Glosten, 1994). Informed traders should prefer to submit market 
orders since their information is short lived and immediate execution of these orders is 
guaranteed. Nonetheless, Kaniel and Liu (2001) argue that informed traders would prefer to 
submit limit orders when their information is long-lived or their valuation is close to the 
current market quotes. A patient informed trader would be more reluctant to submit large 
market orders since by doing so she would signal that the stock is mispriced. If she submits an 
aggressive market order when her valuation is close to the current quotes, she would bear 
price risk. Since large limit orders might also reveal her information advantage, the patient 
informed trader would be more willing to submit partially undisclosed limit orders.  
Finally, limit order traders face parasitic traders, also known as front-runners or quote-
matchers. Even though limit order traders are not informed, the limit order book may be 
informative for other traders. Parasitic traders try to infer information about the security’s 
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value from the exposed liquidity and use front-running strategies to exploit that information. 
These traders are professional ones, with some kind of technological, informational or 
geographical advantage that allows them to issue and cancel orders more quickly than other 
traders (Harris, 1999). Since an asymmetric limit order book may reflect the market sentiment 
or the presence of informed traders, parasitic traders might want to step in front of the heavy 
side of the book. Even if an asymmetric book is uninformative about future price changes, this 
trading strategy might be profitable. If prices move against the front-runner, she may limit 
loses by trading with the heavy side of the book (Harris and Panchapagesan, 1999). 
Consequently, if parasitic traders act frequently, limit order traders would be less willing to 
display their trading interests. Therefore, we should expect limit order traders to place more 
iceberg orders when the risk of being front-run is high.  
The design of the trading system may aggravate the exposure costs of limit order traders. 
First, the parasitic traders’ activity is facilitated when the complete limit order book is 
accessible in real time for all public traders, as it is usually the case in pure electronic order 
driven markets. Therefore, parasitic traders benefit from pre-trade transparency (see 
Madhavan, 2000). Second, the size of the minimum price increment (tick) determines the cost 
of obtaining precedence through price priority in a financial market and, hence, the 
profitability of front-running strategies. Several papers evidence that decreasing the NYSE 
minimum price variation reduces the quoted size throughout the limit order book (e.g., 
Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000) and induces the specialist to step ahead of the heavy side of 
the book more frequently (e.g., Harris and Panchapagesian, 1999). 
Moreover, order driven markets use secondary order precedence rules, like the time 
precedence rule and the display precedence rule, to encourage limit order traders to display 
orders. These secondary order precedence rules, however, are only meaningful when 
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protected by an economically significant tick (Harris, 1999). Harris (1996) evidences that in 
the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange large ticks are associated with greater order 
display. Similarly, D’Hondt et al. (2001) for the Paris Euro-NM and Aitken, Berkman and 
Mak (2001) for the Australian Stock Exchange provide cross-sectional evidence that the use 
of hidden orders is negatively related to the relative tick size. These findings support the 
hypothesis that undisclosed limit orders are used to reduce the option value of limit orders as 
a defensive strategy against parasitic traders. 
In summary, iceberg order placement is expected to increase whenever limit order traders 
perceive an increase in the exposure risk, either due to higher adverse selection costs or higher 
activity by parasitic traders. By submitting undisclosed limit orders, they reduce the option 
value of their orders, mitigate information asymmetry risk and prevent unfavorable price 
reactions.  
From a market design point of view, iceberg orders represent a real trade-off between 
liquidity and transparency. On the one hand, trading systems need to attract liquidity and they 
want traders to display that liquidity. Iceberg orders encourage traders to supply liquidity 
when they might be reluctant to fully disclose their trading interests. On the other hand, 
iceberg orders diminish the benefits of a transparent limit order book. The dissemination of 
order book information is assumed to sharply reduce the costs of monitoring the market, 
permits real-time assessment of liquidity, reduces information asymmetries and improves 
price efficiency (e.g., Madhavan, 2000; Bloomfield and O’Hara, 2000). Therefore, order-
driven systems that allow traders to submit iceberg orders impose certain degree of opacity in 
an apparently transparent trading mechanism. Iceberg orders increase the total available 
liquidity, but liquidity demanders only learn about the undisclosed size when these iceberg 
orders execute. Certainly, limit order traders might protect themselves from an elevated 
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exposure risk using other strategies rather than submitting hidden orders. For example, by 
breaking up their large orders into small ones and spreading them over time, the limit order 
trader may reduce the probability of being front-run and the price impact of their orders. They 
can also cancel and modify orders more frequently or simply switch to market orders. These 
alternative mechanisms of protection, however, might increase the trader’s transaction costs 
and either reduce or consume liquidity.  
3. Institutional background 
Since 1995, the Spanish Stock Exchange Interconnection System (SIBE) is the computer-
assisted trading platform that communicates the four Spanish Stock Exchanges (Madrid, 
Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia). This electronic system holds the trading activity of the most 
active and liquid stocks of the SSE. Drawing on its leading-edge technology, the SIBE 
enables large trading volume to be handled efficiently and transparently, providing real time 
information and immediate dissemination of trading data.  
The SIBE is organized as an order-driven market with a continuous trading session from 
9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and two call auctions, the first one determines the opening price (8:30-
9:00 a.m.) and the second one determines the official closing price (5:30-5:35 p.m.). 
Investor’s orders are placed in the electronic system through brokers. During the pre-opening 
auction, orders can be entered, altered or cancelled, but no trade occurs. The limit order book 
is partially visible since tentative equilibrium auction prices and volumes are publicized and 
revised continuously. The auction finishes with a 30-seconds random-end period that fixes the 
definitive opening price. During the continuous trading session, orders can be submitted, 
modified or cancelled. A trade takes place whenever a counterpart order hits the quotes. The 
open market is governed by a strict price-time priority rule: limit orders at the highest bid or 
the lowest ask take priority over the other orders. At a given price, orders are executed in the 
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sequence they are submitted to the system. An order might lose priority when modified. 
Stocks in the SSE are quoted in euros. The minimum price variation (tick) depends on the 
trade price. The tick equals €0.01 for prices below €50 and €0.05 for prices above €50. 
Three basic types of orders are allowed. Market orders are executed against the best prices 
on the opposite side of the book. These orders walk up the book until they are fulfilled. 
Market to limit orders do not specify a limit price but are limited to the best opposite-side 
price on the book at the time of entry; the non-executed part is stored in the book as a limit 
order at that price. Finally, limit orders are to be executed at the limit price or better. For all of 
these orders and during the continuous market, brokers may specify special execution 
restrictions: “execute and eliminate”, “minimum execution” and “fill or kill”. By default, 
orders expire at the end of the session. Nonetheless, the broker can enter a specific expiration 
date for each order submitted. The maximum validity period is 90 calendar days. The 
minimum order size is one share. 
The SIBE allows submitting partially undisclosed limit orders. Only the supervisor of the 
SIBE and the broker that submits the order know of its presence. Managers of the SIBE 
consider iceberg orders as “interesting for large orders, so as to avoid adverse price 
movements” (see SIBE, 2001). The investor chooses the “displayed volume unit” of the order, 
with a minimum of 250 shares. A new displayed volume unit emerges as soon as the current 
one is executed. The hidden part of the order loses, however, its time precedence. During the 
call auctions, hidden orders take part at their total volume.  
In the SIBE, iceberg orders might be used to camouflage large pre-arranged trades by 
submitting, in sequence, two matching orders. During the Special Operations Market (SOM) 
which opens after the closing call auction (5:40 to 8:00 p.m.), a member of the SSE can cross 
his/her clients’ buyer and seller-initiated orders. This pre-arranged trades or “applications”, 
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however, are subject to very restrictive price and minimum size conditions. Moreover, the 
broker cannot accumulate orders from different clients. During the open trading session this 
kind of pre-matched trades are forbidden. Nonetheless, the iceberg order placement might 
facilitate members to match large-sized trades at the current quotes or at prices inside the 
current bid-ask spread and to pull together orders from different clients. In addition to hidden 
orders and the SOM, brokers may also manage large volume orders through the Block Market 
(BM). Trading hours are from 9:00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. The BM handles pre-arranged trades and 
competitive large orders but, again, under very rigid price and minimum size conditions. 
The SIBE includes a computerized Dissemination Information System (DIS) designed to 
distribute trade, order book and index information in real time. This system guarantees a high 
degree of pre-trade and post-trade transparency (Madhavan, 2000). The most important 
indicator of how the SSE is performing is the IBEX-35 index. It is composed of the 35 most 
liquid and active SIBE securities during the most recent six-months control period. The 
composition is ordinarily revised twice a year, but extraordinary revisions are possible due to 
major events like mergers or new stock issues. The IBEX-35 is computed as a cross-stock 
average trade price weighted by market capitalization.4 
4. Data 
 The database includes all the information provided in real time by the SIBE DIS to any 
entity connected to the system. Therefore, we have the same information that any broker 
member of the SSE receives from her vendor feed. The limit order book (LOB) data contain 
the five best buy and sell positions, including quotes, depths and number of orders. The book 
is updated each time there is a change in these best positions. Additionally, the trade related 
information details the price, the volume and the counter-parties of the trade. A new register 
enters each time a trade is carried out on the system. We consider the sample period July-
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December 2000, 124 trading days. The database includes information on all SIBE-listed 
stocks. However, we keep only those stocks that traded the whole year and were included in 
the IBEX-35 index at least 6 months (36 stocks). We only exclude one stock that disappeared 
due to a merger. Table I provides some descriptive statistics on the 36 stocks, including the 
average IBEX-35 weight and measures of liquidity, trading activity and volatility averaged 
per 30 minutes intervals. Albeit these are the most liquid and active stocks of the system and 
they cover the major portion of the market activity, Table I evidences remarkable differences 
among them in terms of market capitalization, liquidity, activity and volatility. Usually, the 
most liquid stocks are the most active but not necessarily the less volatile ones. Using 
Spearman rank correlations, we obtain a significant correlation between market capitalization 
and trading activity (0.65 with share volume and 0.61 with the number of trades) at the 1% 
level and between market capitalization and liquidity (0.27 with depth and –0.25 with spread) 
at the 10% level. Market capitalization and volatility are not significantly correlated. 
[Table I] 
We have perfectly matched both the book data and the trade data. A direct comparison of 
both files allows us to classify all the movements of the LOB into cancellations, 
modifications, market or marketable limit orders, market-to-limit orders and limit orders. 
Buyer and seller-initiated trades are labeled as aggressive whenever they exhaust, at least, the 
best quote on the opposite side of the book. This implies that an aggressive order consumes 
the total (both disclosed and undisclosed) depth available at that quote.  
Since hidden orders are not marked as such on the SIBE DIS screens, we cannot identify 
all iceberg order submissions and cancellations. However, we can detect executed iceberg 
orders by comparing the reported trade size with the associated change in the LOB. That is, 
we do not have information on all the hidden orders submitted and the specific times of 
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submission; we are making inferences only with the hidden orders that become partially or 
totally executed. Consequently, our findings are conditional on the implicit assumption that 
the subsample of executed iceberg orders is representative of the whole sample of iceberg 
orders submitted. All the theoretical arguments revised in section 2 suggest that iceberg orders 
should be mainly competitive limit orders, that is, limit orders inside the best quotes or limit 
orders hitting the best quotes. If hidden order traders submit non-competitive limit prices, 
there would be scarce arguments to motivate a partial concealing of the order size. Firstly, 
front-runners would be a minor problem since we would be dealing with patient traders that 
do not worry about the time to execution. Secondly, the larger premiums/discounts associated 
with non-competitive limit order prices could be enough to compensate the higher adverse 
selection costs associated with large limit orders. Therefore, we believe that our sample of 
executed hidden orders is a good approximation of the whole set of hidden orders submitted. 
For the same motive, we do not expect the time of execution to be far apart from the time of 
submission. Roughly 60% of all trades involving hidden volume are fulfilled when there is 
only one limit order supporting the best quote on the LOB. Following backwards the 
evolution of these limit orders, it is possible to find the exact time of submission for 104.452 
iceberg orders. Around 93% of these orders were placed inside the best quotes. The median 
time-to-execution for these orders is 3 minutes. Finally, since we focus on the effective 
contribution of hidden orders to trading and the impact of hidden volume detection, the 
information on hidden orders executions is enough to accomplish our goals. Table I reports 
that, on average, 26.26% of all trades in our database involve hidden volume, 19.70% of all 
non-aggressive trades and 41.68% of all aggressive trades. We do not find remarkable 
differences between buyer and seller initiated trades.   
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5. The intra-daily distribution of hidden orders 
In this section we study the intra-daily distribution of hidden orders. We divide the 
continuous trading session of the SSE (from 9:00 a.m. to 17:30 p.m.) into seventeen half-hour 
intervals. For each interval we compute the number of trades comprising hidden orders. We 
also compute the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the time-weighed average cumulative 
depth at the five best ask and bid quotes, the volume (number of shares) executed and the 
number of trades completed. Volatility is the ratio between the highest and the lowest quote 
midpoint in each interval minus one. To facilitate comparisons, each of the previous variables 
has been normalized and standardized for every stock as follows. We divide each observation 
by the average of the corresponding day. Then, we compute the mean of these normalized 
observations for each half-hour interval. Finally, we subtract one from each half-hour mean 
and divide it by the standard deviation of the 17 half-hour intervals. Figure 1 represents the 
equally weighted average of these normalized and standardized measures for the 36 stocks.5     
[Figure 1] 
This figure shows the familiar U-shaped patterns in volatility and trading activity but not in 
quoted spreads and depths. Spreads achieve their maximum at the opening interval but do not 
increase towards the end of the session. Depths achieve their minimum at the beginning of the 
day and their maximum at the end of the day. Therefore, the SSE attains its highest liquidity 
levels towards the end of the day. For the hidden volume series, we obtain average 
correlations of 75.24% with the number of trades, 89.95% with the share volume, –17.76% 
with the time weighted average bid-ask spread, 42.58% with the time weighted average 
quoted depth, and 36.23% with volatility. 
Figure 1 also reports a new finding: the effective contribution of hidden orders to the 
trading activity increases towards the end of the trading session, reaching its maximum during 
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the last intervals. The patterns indicate that hidden orders emerge in periods of intense trading 
activity and extremely high liquidity. The Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians 
confirms all these patterns are statistically significant. 
Figure 2 represents the median percentage of trades involving hidden volume per half-hour 
interval. There is a remarkable and statistically significant jump just 1 hour before the opening 
of the NYSE (15:30 Spanish time) and the highest percentages are achieved during the next 
trading hour (15:30-16:30). Only during the 14:30-close interval the effective contribution of 
iceberg orders is significantly above the median (13%).  
[Figure 2] 
Finally, we study whether trade size matters in explaining the previous findings. We 
classify all trades into 7 size categories created in the following way. For each firm in the 
sample, we separate buyer from seller-initiated trades. Trades are ordered by their size in 
shares. Trades are then partitioned into the following seven percentile categories: less than 
25% (S1), 25-50% (S2), 50-75% (S3), 75-90% (S4), 90-95% (S5), 95-99% (S6) and greater 
than 99% (S7). The size cut-offs depend on each firm’s trade size distribution. Hence, large 
and small trades are defined for each firm relative to its own order flow experience over the 
entire sample period. Figure 3 presents the equally weighted average of the normalized and 
standardized number of trades in each size category comprising hidden volume. 
[Figure 3] 
This figure reports similar patterns to those already seen in previous figures. Hidden volume 
happens to be especially relevant towards the end of the trading session, and the inflexion 
point is the opening of the NYSE. The relevant point here is that this pattern does not depend 
on the trade size category. In addition, Figure 3 evidences an increase in the average trade size 
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after the opening of the NYSE, suggestive of a concentration of large traders, like institutional 
investors, towards the end of the trading day.  
 The patterns shown in hidden volume suggests non-uniform exposure costs in the course 
of a session. During the opening period, liquidity traders may perceive a higher information 
asymmetry risk, reflected in the lowest liquidity levels, which accentuates the winner’s curse 
problem of submitting limit orders. In addition, during the first half-hour of trading the 
volatility achieves its maximum, 263% larger than its mean (see Figure 1). In this context, 
liquidity providers should prefer to submit (partially) undisclosed limit orders to mitigate 
adverse selection costs. Both informed and uninformed investors may prefer to hide large 
limit orders as to avoid unfavorable price movements and reduce the option value of their 
orders. 
Similarly, the increase in hidden volume just about the opening of the NYSE might be 
explained by an upward revision in the information-asymmetry risk around the initial trading 
intervals at the US market.6 Public announcements in the SSE are specially frequent and 
regular between 14:30 and 16:30. In addition to all the information about the opening of the 
NYSE, unemployment rates, consumption price indexes, GDP data, the University of 
Michigan’s consumer confidence survey, the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESIN) and profit announcements of many firms are usually disseminated during 
this trading interval. 
Previous figures show that the hidden volume is far less frequent during the opening than 
between 14:30-16:30. Therefore, in addition to adverse selection costs, other arguments must 
explain the dramatic ultimate increase in iceberg orders detection. D’Hondt et al. (2001) 
report a large number of hidden orders submitted in the Paris Euro-NM just before the end of 
each auction. These authors hypothesize that the informational value of an order for parasitic 
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traders increases as the end of an auction approaches and, hence, exposure risk becomes 
higher. Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988, 1989) work suggests an alternative explanation, that 
hidden order traders may be trying to take advantage of the benefits of concentrated trading.7 
In fact, during the last trading hours at the SSE, the average trade size reaches maximums and 
trading activity is more intense than in any other moment (see Pascual, Pascual-Fuster and 
Climent, 2003). Hidden order executions should be more difficult to perceive when a large 
number of limit orders are submitted simultaneously and trading is heavy. These periods may 
be also particularly appropriate to hide large applications. 
Finally, our previous discussion suggests that market participants whose quotes contribute 
the greatest information to the market are more likely to use hidden size. Chakravarty (2001) 
evidences that the so-called “stealth trading” hypothesis, where privately informed traders 
concentrate their trades in medium-sizes, appears to be primarily driven by medium-sized 
trades initiated by institutions. Since their quotes may have a greater signaling effect, these 
traders will be more prone to use undisclosed orders in order to reduce free-rider costs of 
displaying size. It is a shared opinion among the SSE traders that the increase in the average 
trade-size during the last trading hours reflects the presence of large institutional investors 
trying to balance their portfolios. These traders may retain their orders until all the pending 
news is finally disseminated around 14:30-16:30.  
6. Hidden orders, the limit order book and the information intensity 
As it was discussed in section 2, the decision of (partially) not disclosing the size of a limit 
order depends on the non-execution risk, which determines the decision of submitting either 
an ordinary limit order or a market order (e.g., Foucault, 1999), and on the order exposure 
risk, which determines whether to submit an ordinary limit order or a hidden limit order. 
Whenever liquidity providers believe that the order exposure risk has augmented, either because 
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they perceive an increase in the information asymmetry risk or a higher risk of being front-run, 
the probability of they choosing undisclosed limit orders also increases.  
In this section we study the probability of undisclosed limit order execution by analyzing 
the determinants of the effective contribution of hidden orders to trading. To achieve this aim, 
we define Ht as a binary variable that equals one whenever a market (or marketable limit) order is 
executed against hidden volume and zero otherwise. Assume there is an underlying response 
variable that measures the liquidity provider’s judgment about the order exposure risk, OERt, 
defined by the linear regression ttt uXOER  
' , where Xt represents a set of control variables, 
 is a vector of unknown parameters and ut is the noise term. Whenever the perceived level of 
order exposure risk is high, say OERt>, the liquidity provider does not reveal the total size of 
his/her position. In this way, hidden volume concentration patterns are the result of a shared 
perception among liquidity providers about the market signals; that is, hidden volume clusters 
occur when many traders coincide in their judgment about the order exposure risk. Whilst OERt is 
not observable, we do can observe the outcome Ht such that )(  tt OERIH , where I(.) is an 
indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition within parenthesis is satisfied and zero 
otherwise. If we assume that ut is normally distributed, we get a Probit model, 
     '1Pr ttttt XXHXHE  ,    [1] 
with Φ(z) being the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
We assume that liquidity traders evaluate the order exposure risk based on two information 
sets, the status of the limit order book and the information intensity. All variables are computed 
over a 5-minutes window before each trade. Book information consists of the quoted bid-ask 
spread ( tSPR ), the number of ticks between the best bid and ask quotes; the net depth, the 
difference between the number of shares on the offer and bid sides of the book, distinguishing 
between net depth at the best quotes ( 1tND ) and net depth between the 2
nd and the 5th best quotes 
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( 52tND ); the net number of limit orders supporting the posted quotes, distinguishing between net 
orders at the best quotes ( 1tNLO ) and net orders between the 2
nd and the 5th best quotes 
( 52tNLO ); and the net “dispersion” of the book ( tNDISP ), measured as the depth-weighted 
average distance (in ticks) from the five best ask quotes to the quote midpoint minus the 
equivalent measure for the bid side of the book.8 For all these book indicators, we compute time-
weighted averages over the 5-minutes window. 
The second set of variables signifies the intensity of information arrival to the market. The 
information intensity set consists on the net number of trades ( tNT ), computed as the 
difference between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades; the net share 
volume ( tNV ), defined as the difference between the buyer-initiated share volume and the seller-
initiated share volume; the net number of limit orders, distinguishing between limit orders inside 
the best quotes ( tNLOIQ ), limit orders hitting the best quotes ( tNLOBQ ), and limit orders with 
worse limit-prices than the best quotes ( tNLO ), all them computed as the difference between the 
number of limit orders to sell and the number of limit orders to buy; and the net number of 
cancellations, defined as the difference between the number of cancellations at the ask side and 
the bid side of the book, setting apart cancellations at the best quotes ( tNCBQ ) from cancellations 
at worst prices than the best quotes ( tNC ). All these measures characterize the recent order flow 
history before each trade. 
Finally, we consider two additional variables: the cumulative mid-quote returns ( tCMR ), 
computed as the signed change in the quote midpoint, and the ratio between the highest and the 
lowest quote midpoint ( tQV ). The first measure captures the recent price trend and the second is a 
proxy of the mid-quote volatility.9  
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All previous variables have been standardized for each of the seventeen half-hour intervals of 
the trading session. As a result of the large number of observations, most of the correlations (not 
reported) among the variables are found to be statistically different from zero, even though most 
of them seem to be negligible. The highest average correlation is found between 52tND  and 
52
tNLO  (0.7), far more larger than that between 
1
tND  and 
1
tNLO  (0.26). The recent price trend 
( tCMR ) is fairly correlated with measures of the information intensity set, like tNT  (0.37) or 
tNLOIQ  (-0.36). These correlations are suggestive of multicolinearity problems. Some 
preliminary tests, however, show no relevant changes in the coefficients estimates depending 
on which set of variables is included in the Probit model.  
Table II summarizes the estimation results of the model [1] for the 36 stocks in the sample. 
For each explanatory variable, we report the median, maximum and minimum of the slope of 
the probability function, evaluated at the average value of the explanatory variables and 
computed using the estimated  coefficients of the estimated model [1], 
βˆ)βˆ()β( iiti
t
xx
x


 , 
where (.)  is the standard normal density function. We also provide the number of 
statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level and their sign. 
[Table II] 
The discussion in section 2 suggests several testable hypotheses regarding the probability 
of hidden order execution. On the one hand, if undisclosed limit orders are used to reduce the 
option value of limit orders as a defensive strategy against parasitic traders, then: 
Hypothesis 1: Liquidity providers will hide more volume on the heavy side of the book, since 
parasitic traders are expected to infer the market sentiment from asymmetric limit order 
books.  
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Hypothesis 2: Liquidity providers will hide more volume during periods of intense price 
improvement in the same side of the book, because this may be a signal of front-running 
activity. 
Hypothesis 3: Liquidity providers will hide less volume when the bid-ask spread is tight, 
because the likelihood of being front-run decreases and the time precedence rule is more 
effective. 
On the other hand, liquidity providers would be averse to submit large limit orders 
whenever the perceived risk of trading against informed traders is high. Sellers (buyers) will 
raise their perceived information-asymmetry risk whenever the book accumulates more orders 
on the bid (ask) side, the length of the book on the ask (bid) side is larger than on the bid (ask) 
side, price improvement is more common on the bid (ask) side, or seller (buyer) initiated 
trades are less frequent than buyer (seller) initiated trades. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4: Limit order traders hide more volume when providing liquidity against the 
market trend because they face a higher information asymmetry risk. 
The empirical evidence in Table II provides little support to the argument that undisclosed 
volume is used as a mechanism to reduce the option value of limit orders for parasitic traders. 
Indeed, hypotheses 1 to 3 are rejected for the greater part of the sample. First, we found a 
strong and negative (positive) relationship between net depth and hidden volume on the ask 
(bid) side of the book, rejecting the hypothesis 1. This relationship is stronger for 1tND  than 
for 52tND . Table II also reports a positive (negative) association between 
1
tNLO  and hidden 
volume on the ask (bid) side of the book. Altogether, hidden volume on the ask (bid) side of 
the book is more frequent when the market is heavier on the bid (ask) side and the average 
size of the limit orders to buy (sell) is larger. Second, we found a strong negative (positive) 
relationship between tNLOIQ  and hidden volume on the ask (bid) side of the book; that is, when 
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price improvement is more frequent on the bid (ask) side of the book, hidden volume is more 
common on the ask (bid) side of the book. This result contradicts hypothesis 2. Finally, the 
relationship between the bid-ask spread and hidden volume detection is negative, which disagrees 
with hypothesis 3. 
On the contrary, the results in Table II are more supportive of the hypothesis that 
undisclosed limit orders are used to mitigate adverse selection costs. Table II suggests that 
hidden volume is placed on the side of the book with higher adverse selection costs. 
Undisclosed limit orders to buy (sell) are more frequent when the net depth is positive 
(negative) and the average size of the posted limit orders to sell (buy) at the best quotes is 
larger. An asymmetric book may reflect the traders’ sentiment, the likely direction of future 
price changes, or even informed traders. A larger average order size on the opposite side of 
the book may also reveal the presence of institutional investors or informed traders. 
Moreover, a higher degree of dispersion on the ask (bid) side of the book, 0tNDISP  (<0), 
increases the probability of hitting iceberg orders on that side of the book. Therefore, hidden 
orders are found in the side of the book where the expected price impact of trades is larger, 
traders are less willing to provide liquidity and there is an apparent weaker consensus about 
the true value of the stock.10 The variables in the information arrival set provide additional 
support. The probability of hidden volume on the ask (bid) side of the book is positively 
(negatively) related with tNT  and negatively (positively) associated with tNLOIQ . This finding 
means that undisclosed limit orders are more likely used when providing liquidity against the 
market trend, which is consistent with previous findings. Notice that tNT  is much more 
informative about iceberg orders than tNV .  
Mid-quote volatility ( tQV ) has a strong negative effect on the use of hidden volume. Handa 
and Schwartz (1996) suggest that a rise in volatility due to informed trading discourages the 
placement of limit orders. Foucault (1999), however, predicts just the opposite: when volatility 
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due to informed trading increases, limit order traders’ risk of being picked off by informed traders 
increases. Consequently, traders post less attractive quotes and this causes market order trading to 
be more costly. As a consequence, the proportion of limit orders in the order flow increases. 
How can these theoretical predictions be reconciled with our empirical finding? On the one 
hand, if information-induced volatility causes limit order traders to post less aggressive prices so 
that higher margins compensate higher adverse selection costs, the use of hidden orders will be 
needless. This argument is also consistent with the weaker but negative relationship between 
tSPR  and the probability of picking off hidden orders. On the other hand, information-driven 
volatility may discourage all kind of large limit order traders either disclosed or undisclosed. But, 
what if tQV  is not information-driven. Both Glosten (1994) and Handa and Schwartz (1996) 
predict that transitory volatility triggered by noise traders encourages limit order placement. This 
is because, other things being equal, the greater the volatility, the greater the probability of a limit-
order being picked off and, consequently, the shorter the expected time to execution. Therefore, if 
tQV  only reflected transitory volatility there would be no reason to expect a positive relationship 
with the probability of hidden order detection.11 
7. The information content of hidden orders 
In this section, we investigate the market response when hidden volume is exposed to all 
traders. We evaluate the information content of iceberg orders by studying its impact on the 
stock returns. We also study how it influences trading strategies by analyzing its effect on 
liquidity and the composition of the order flow. 
For each minute in a five-minute window before each trade, we compute the following 
variables, already defined in the previous section: the bid-ask spread ( tSPR ) and the net depth 
( 1tND +
52
tND ) both weighted by time, the net number of trades ( tNT ), the net share volume 
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( tNV ), and the net number of limit order submissions, pooling tNLOIQ , tNLOBQ  and tNLO  in 
previous section. We also compute the cumulative mid-quote returns ( tCMR ) and the mid-quote 
volatility ( tQV ) 5, 10 and 30 minutes after the trade and until the closing of the trading session. 
These variables summarize the aspects of the market this section focus on: liquidity, order flow, 
volatility and returns. We separate buyer from seller-initiated trades and standardize the variables 
for each of the seventeen half-hour intervals of the trading session. Finally, we bring together all 
trades belonging to the same trade-size category (S1 to S7). We use this information to construct 
matched samples of trades evidencing hidden volume and ordinary trades. Namely, we 
construct two matched samples for each of the S1-S7 trade-size categories, one for buyer-
initiated trades and another for seller-initiated trades. 12, 13 Table III provides some details on 
the resulting matched samples. This table shows that the matching becomes more difficult as 
the trade size augments and the pre-trade matching interval increases from 1 to 5 minutes. We 
discard S7 trades from the posterior analysis because of the small number of matched 
observations. Table III also evidences that there are no remarkable trade size differences 
between the matched samples.    
[Table III] 
Next, for each variable and for each trade size category, we construct 1000 subsamples of 
1000 matched trades randomly selected from the respective samples in Table III. For each 
subsample, we compute the non-parametric Wilcoxon test of equality of medians. Tables IV 
and V report the proportion of cases for which the null hypothesis of equality of medians is 
rejected and the proportion of cases for which the null is rejected against the alternative 
hypothesis that the median of the corresponding variable for the 1000 trades revealing hidden 
liquidity is larger than the median for the matched ordinary trades.  
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Table IV focuses on liquidity and order flow in the 10-minute interval centered on the 
execution of each trade.  This table reports the results for the S4 trade-size category, trades 
with size between the 75% and 90% percentiles of the empirical trade-size distribution of the 
corresponding stock, and for a 1-minute pre-matching interval. The results for the other trade 
size categories and for the 5-minute pre-matching interval are identical and available upon 
request from the authors. 
[Table IV] 
 This table shows that the hidden volume detection has a remarkable impact neither on the 
net limit order book depth nor on the net limit order submission. Nonetheless, there is 
evidence of a narrower bid-ask spread and a more intense buyer (seller) initiated trading 
activity after a trade that discovers the presence of hidden volume on the ask (bid) side of the 
limit order book than after an equally-sized and pre-trade matched ordinary trade, at least up 
to one minute after. The presence of hidden volume reduces the impact of posterior trades and 
this may explain the narrower bid-ask spread with respect to an ordinary trade of equal size. 
The increased trading activity together with the irrelevant impact on the submission of limit 
orders indicates that the aggressiveness of traders temporally increases when the presence of 
hidden volume is exposed to the market. The possibility of buying or selling larger quantities 
at the same cost induces traders to submit more aggressive orders to consume the hidden part 
of the available liquidity. These effects, however, dissipate quickly. 
Table V provides the findings for the cumulative mid-quote returns and the mid-quote 
volatility. If hidden orders are informative, we should observe some positive (negative) 
impact on stock returns when a hidden buy (sell) volume is exposed to the market. Indeed, 
Tuttle (2002) observes that the presence of hidden depth on the relevant side of the market 
indicates that the price will move against the trade. Additionally, she detects that price 
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reactions are stronger when market participants quoting hidden size are those working large 
institutional orders. Our findings in Table V, however, do not support the hypothesis that 
hidden orders are information-motivated. There are no statistically significant difference 
between the return of a trade revealing hidden volume and the return of an equally sized and 
matched ordinary trade, independently of the time horizon considered. The results with a 5-
minute pre-trade matching interval (not reported) are exactly equal. Regarding volatility, it is 
weakly lower in the short-run after a trade revealing hidden volume but, again, this effect 
dissipates in a few minutes. Therefore, these findings indicate that the market does not 
attribute any unknown information content to the hidden side of liquidity. 
8. Summary, conclusions and final comments 
In this paper, we have studied hidden orders in a continuous electronic pure order-driven 
market, the Stock Exchange Interconnection System of the Spanish Stock Exchange. Using 
six months of limit order book and transaction data on the stocks with higher activity rates 
and liquidity levels, we have identified all market (or marketable) orders that picked off 
hidden limit orders, and we have used this information to study the effective contribution of 
hidden limit orders to the trading process. 
We have shown that hidden volume concentrates towards the end of the trading session, 
when the NYSE and the SSE sessions overlap. Our findings strongly support the hypothesis 
that liquidity suppliers use iceberg orders to mitigate adverse selection costs. There is no 
evidence that corroborates the alternative hypothesis that hidden orders are submitted to 
reduce the option value of limit orders for parasitic traders. Finally, our results suggest that 
hidden orders have no relevant impact on returns or volatility but, when they are revealed to 
the marketplace, they temporally increase the aggressiveness of traders. 
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Our findings contrast with the practitioners’ beliefs about the use of hidden orders. We 
provide evidence suggesting that iceberg orders are not mainly used to avoid unfavorable 
price movements since no relevant permanent price impact is associated with the discovery of 
hidden volume. Our results also contradict the idea that hidden orders are used to prevent 
from being front-run since all the theoretical arguments based on this hypothesis have been 
statistically rejected. On the contrary, our findings indicate that hidden orders are a vehicle to 
obscure the trading strategy of large and uninformed investors aimed to reduce adverse 
selection costs. This behavior would explain why the market does not attribute any relevant 
information content to the discovery of undisclosed liquidity. Therefore, market regulators 
could draw two basic implications from the SSE experience: the main motive of hiding 
volume is protection against informed traders and iceberg orders have distorting effects 
neither on prices nor on volatility. 
This study suggests additional questions for further empirical research. Our findings report 
that traders submit iceberg orders to manage the information asymmetry risk. Therefore, we 
should expect the use of iceberg orders to be more frequent in illiquid and infrequently traded 
stocks, foreign stocks and highly volatile stocks (like companies of new technologies or R&D 
firms), usually associated with higher adverse selection costs. A cross-sectional analysis of 
these and alternative sets of stocks could provide further insights in the use of hidden orders. 
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Footnotes   
1. For instance, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) report that investors in the Paris Bourse place limit orders when 
the spread is large or the order book is thin. Limit order placements that improve upon the best quotes occur in 
succession and on the same side of the book, suggesting competition in the supply of liquidity. Ahn, Bae and 
Chan (2001) observe that investors in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange submit more buy (sell) limit orders 
relative to market orders when liquidity-driven transitory volatility rises from the ask (bid) side (see Hamao and 
Hasbrouck, 1995, Daníelson and Payne, 2001, and Ranaldo, 2003, for further evidence). Coppejans, Domowitz 
and Madhavan (2002) evidence that volatility shocks in the electronic market for Swedish stocks index futures 
(OMX) reduce liquidity. Shocks to liquidity, however, dissipate quickly, indicating a high degree of resiliency. 
Finally, Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) also evidence that an automated market can operate well in a relatively 
illiquid setting. 
2. Seppi (1997) proposes a theoretical model of liquidity provision where a specialist competes against a limit 
order book. In this model, a hybrid market, like the NYSE, provides better liquidity to small retail and 
institutional trades, but a pure order driven market may offer better liquidity on mid-sized orders. Degryse 
(1999) compares the costs of trading Belgian shares on both the order-driven Brussels CATS system and the 
London SEAQ dealership market. He concludes that total trading costs on the CATS market are smaller for 
small trade sizes. de Jong et al. (1995) obtain similar findings in a comparison of the Paris Bourse and the 
SEAQ. Huang (2002) compares the liquidity provision on both the ECNs and the market makers of the Nasdaq. 
In general, ECNs quoted spreads are smaller that dealer quoted spreads. Pirrong (1996), Frino et al. (1998), and 
Kofman and Moser (1997) evidence nearly equal bid-ask spreads, adverse selection components, and pricing 
efficiency in automated limit order books relative to floor trading venues. 
3. Aitken et al. (2001) report a cross-sectional positive and significant relationship between the relative price 
volatility and the use of undisclosed limit orders. Tuttle (2000) also finds the residuals of the market model, as a 
measure of the idiosyncratic risk, to be positively and significantly related to the use of hidden size. However, 
she also observes that the mid-quote volatility is negatively associated with the proportion of hidden-size and the 
market-model beta has no explanatory power. 
4. For more complete and detailed information on the SSE regulation, organization and trading procedures please 
visit http://www.sbolsas.es. 
5. The intra-daily patterns for capitalization-weighted averages are similar. This information is available upon 
request from the authors. 
6. Pascual, Pascual-Fuster and Climent (2003) study the contribution of the NYSE to the price discovery process 
of the Spanish stocks cross-listed at the NYSE. All these dually listed stocks are among the stocks in this paper’s 
sample.  
7. In their 1988 model, trading clusters result from the strategic behavior of traders. Admati and Pfleiderer argue 
that liquidity traders have strong incentives to concentrate their trading in order to minimize the price impact of 
their trades. Even though liquidity-trading concentration attracts informed traders, the competition between 
informed traders intensifies the forces leading to the cluster of trading by liquidity traders since prices are more 
informative in those periods. In their 1989 model, trading clusters result from a “divide and conquer” strategy by 
market makers. Volume concentration serves in this model to discourage short-lived information acquisition by 
informed traders while giving liquidity traders more favorable terms of trade.   
8. A high absolute net dispersion value may be interpreted as a signal of little consensus regarding the true value 
of the stock; it may be informative about future price changes or it may indicate the presence of informed 
traders; it may also be interpreted as a measure of the willingness of traders to provide liquidity at a given side of 
the limit order book; finally, it may also be a measure of the expected price impact of large market orders. 
Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) construct a similar measure they call the “length” of the book. 
9. We have also considered other volatility proxies, like the standard deviation of the quote midpoint, the 
cumulative squared relative changes of the quote midpoint and even asymmetric volatility, computed as the 
difference between the cumulative squared relative changes of the best ask and bid quotes. A priori, there is no 
reason to prefer one proxy to the others.    
10. Even if large absolute values of NDISt are not associated with future price changes, it may still provide 
relevant information to traders. Ahn et al. (2001) and Bae et al. (2003) show that traders place more limit orders 
relative to market orders when they expect high transitory price volatility. Ahn et al. argue that transitory 
volatility is induced by temporary order imbalances. This liquidity-driven price volatility “will attract public 
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traders to submit limit orders rather than market orders, as the gains from supplying liquidity can more than 
offset the potential loss from trading with informed traders” (Handa and Schwartz, 1996). Therefore, NDISt >0 
(<0) might precede a raise in transitory volatility induced by the ask (bid) side of the book. If this is the case, 
NDISt >0 (<0) should encourage the placement of limit orders on the ask (bid) side of the book. Our results do 
not contradict this argument; they rather suggest that traders prefer to submit partially undisclosed that totally 
disclosed limit orders.   
11. As a matter of robustness, we have also estimated the Probit model [1] for each of the trade-size categories 
S1-S7 defined in section 5 and for each of the 17 half-hour trading intervals of the SSE continuous session. 
Explanatory variables are standardized accordingly and the results are consistent.  
 
12. A matched sample design is justified in this case by the empirical findings in the previous section. To ensure 
that any difference in stock price movements, order flow or trading activity is only attributable to the detection of 
hidden volume, the situation before a trade detecting hidden volume takes place must be akin to the situation 
before an equally-sized ordinary trade occurs.  
 
13. The matching procedure for each trade-size category is as follows: We eliminate trades preceded by some 
other trade detecting hidden volume within the last 5 minutes. For the ordinary trades, we also discard trades 
followed by some other trade detecting hidden volume within 5 minutes after their execution. These filters 
reduce the risk of market conditions being affected by previous or posterior orders evidencing undisclosed 
volume. For the remaining trades, we compute the percentiles 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% of the empirical 
distribution of each the variables previously defined. These percentiles are the thresholds of the 5 categories used 
to characterize the level of all the variables during the five-minute window before each particular trade. For each 
trade that detects hidden volume, we look for an ordinary trade with perfectly matching prior market conditions. 
If no matching occurs, the trade of reference is eliminated. If multiple matching occurs, we choose the ordinary 
trade with the minimum sum of the absolute deviations in prior market conditions with respect to the trade of 
reference. Two alternative matching periods have been considered: 1 minute before each trade and 5 minutes 
before each trade. Our main results are independent of the matching interval considered. 
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TABLE I 
Sample: descriptive statistics 
This table reports some descriptive statistics for the 36 most liquid stocks in the SSE in July-December 2000. The table reports the average 
weight of each stock during the year 2000. The other statistics are computed for a 30-minutes time resolution. Both spread and depth are 
averages weighted by time. The spread is the difference between the best ask and bid quotes. The tick is 0.01€ for all the stocks. The depth 
is the total shares offered at the five best ask and bid quotes. The minimum depth per quote is one share. Volume is the number of shares 
transferred. The minimum trade size is one share. Volatility is the ratio between the max and the min of the quote midpoint minus one. 
Finally, this table provides the percentage of (all, non aggressive and aggressive) trades involving hidden volume. In each column, we 
remark in bold format the ten stocks with higher capitalization, narrower spread, larger depth, higher trading activity, lower volatility and 
higher proportions of hidden volume detection, respectively. 
 
IBEX-35 Hidden Volume Detection (%) 
Average Total Non-Aggres. Aggressive
Stock Weight (%) Spread Depth Volume Trades Volatility Trades Trades Trades
ACR 0.3745 0.0295 25271.85 15883.48 21.83 0.00463 23.75 14.88 41.32
ACS 0.5897 0.111 8355.51 8163.52 14.7 0.00431 21.81 17.07 29.01
ACX 0.5529 0.114 7490 11063.12 19.38 0.00509 25.80 18.85 35.96
AGS 0.6047 0.0607 10514.07 10079.68 13.75 0.00493 28.07 26.85 29.63
ALB 0.6859 0.1694 6019.58 7891.9 11.17 0.00475 25.26 23.59 27.18
ALT 1.6125 0.0395 22629.36 78207.32 45.52 0.00591 26.64 20.08 42.05
AMS 2.2001 0.0268 28813.95 80405.57 54.44 0.00853 30.49 22.13 48.69
ANA 0.8247 0.134 5693.53 7876.4 16.99 0.00423 27.11 21.73 34.71
AUM 0.2915 0.0763 12930.9 6975.17 4.6 0.0014 26.05 24.53 28.81
BBVA 15.3956 0.0163 132761.51 456637.09 119.09 0.00486 24.19 14.92 56.51
BKT 1.1942 0.1117 7075.9 14850.56 32.93 0.00519 24.81 14.96 42.77
CAN 0.7757 0.1142 14283.19 9607.05 8.86 0.0034 25.46 26.24 24.37
CTG 2.6269 0.0629 13412.56 25156.06 21.76 0.00536 33.20 31.32 35.87
DRC 0.4038 0.0342 28075.33 44219.33 25.94 0.0062 30.69 26.56 38.52
ELE 6.7036 0.0233 45427.93 214150.42 88.05 0.00466 26.34 17.61 50.3
FCC 0.7421 0.0762 10302.08 11728.69 19.04 0.00532 26.34 20.77 34.85
FER 0.5673 0.0453 12364.11 11272.55 23.4 0.00506 24.67 15.95 42.08
GPP 0.1478 0.0157 84238.83 68225.26 36.51 0.00982 24.38 9.65 60.34
IBE 3.798 0.0246 55397.08 143763.62 44.63 0.00464 29.22 21.42 45.96
IDR 0.5529 0.0547 10999.82 18657.93 31.27 0.00674 26.93 16.96 44.73
MAP 0.2506 0.1083 11305.52 9195.94 6.93 0.00446 28.76 26.64 31.66
NHH 0.3083 0.0588 19638.23 23728.58 13.71 0.00492 26.59 27.3 25.48
POP 2.1956 0.0819 12404.15 26498.34 27.31 0.00412 30.54 27.2 35.91
PRS 1.6592 0.0741 10117.32 27249.8 32.67 0.00578 22.44 14.78 41.54
REE 0.5065 0.0427 16547.39 9656.78 16.51 0.00473 22.20 13.88 36.88
REP 7.7296 0.023 47288.48 247408.24 97.42 0.00509 26.73 18.26 50.31
SCH 14.162 0.013 283176.86 654880.1 174.31 0.00531 18.31 11.12 61.04
SGC 1.1269 0.1069 6018.71 12844.13 32.14 0.00698 27.33 18.31 40.45
SOL 0.6264 0.0443 15454.02 18492.25 17.25 0.00543 27.57 22.69 35.71
TEF 23.0108 0.0149 117941.66 1335221.13 388.8 0.00705 22.10 11.6 63.16
TPI 1.1352 0.0223 31878.48 78430.54 59.38 0.00892 29.45 19.44 52.21
TPZ 0.4117 0.0157 108745.55 93100.63 49.89 0.00753 21.43 13.02 55
TRR 3.5387 0.0517 15281.65 212069.22 270.45 0.01257 28.10 19.64 51.41
UNF 1.8017 0.0418 33398.14 47491.26 24.38 0.00363 28.23 21.38 39.37
VAL 0.2517 0.0287 25980.4 20988.67 15 0.00506 27.43 23.24 35.4
ZEL 0.6406 0.0829 12138.53 58128.22 104.54 0.00924 26.77 14.73 51.28
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TABLE II 
Probit Analysis 
This table provides, for each standardized explanatory variable, the median, maximum and minimum across stocks of the slope of the probability function of the Probit model [1]. The number of significant coefficients at 
the 1% level and its sign is also reported. The dependent variable (Ht) is the probability of detecting hidden volume on a given side of the limit order book. For a detailed description of the explanatory variables see 
section 6. All variables are defined over a 5-minutes interval before each trade. Variables in the “status of the book” set: SPR = bid-ask spread, ND1 = net depth at the best quotes, ND25 = net depth between the 2nd and 
the 5th best quotes, NLO1 = net number of limit order supporting the best quotes, NLO25 = net number of limit orders between the 2nd and the 5th best quotes, NDISP = net dispersion of the book. Variables in the 
“information intensity” set: NV = net share volume, NT = net number of trades, NLOBQ = net number or limit orders hitting the best quotes, NLO = net number of limit orders with worst limit prices than the best quote, 
NLOIQ = net number of limit orders inside the best quotes, NCBQ = net number of cancellations at the best quotes, NC = net number of cancellations between the 2nd and the 5th quote, CMR = cumulative mid-quote 
returns, QV = mid-quote volatility.  
Panel A: Ask Side of the Book
SPR ND 1 ND 25 NLO 1 NLO 25 NDISP NV NT NLOBQ NLO NLOIQ NCBQ NC CMR QV Psd. R2 Obs.
Median -0.0116 -0.0237 -0.0127 0.0162 0.0063 0.0111 0.0082 0.0248 0.0083 0.0049 -0.0270 0.0068 0.0069 -0.0074 -0.0198 0.0249 23556
Max 0.0145 -0.0063 0.0186 0.0241 0.0189 0.0210 0.0164 0.0408 0.0172 0.0102 -0.0076 0.0168 0.0133 0.0089 0.0054 0.0441 496390
Min -0.0368 -0.0392 -0.0329 0.0036 -0.0188 0.0033 0.0048 -0.0248 -0.0081 -0.0099 -0.0472 -0.0081 -0.0187 -0.0278 -0.0438 0.0090 3529
Signif. (1%) 30 35 17 25 16 26 11 36 13 9 36 11 11 12 35
Positive 3 0 3 25 10 26 11 34 11 5 0 9 9 3 1
Panel B: Bid Side of the Book
SPR ND 1 ND 25 NLO 1 NLO 25 NDISP NV NT NLOBQ NLO NLOIQ NCBQ NC CMR QV Psd. R2 Obs.
Median -0.0105 0.0194 0.0132 -0.0118 -0.0083 -0.0121 -0.0078 -0.0214 -0.0088 -0.0053 0.0224 -0.0074 -0.0101 0.0095 -0.0139 0.0280 30676
Max 0.0075 0.0437 0.0355 0.0073 0.0235 -0.0027 -0.0033 0.0059 -0.0043 0.0089 0.0618 -0.0016 0.0039 0.0160 0.0054 0.0549 309672
Min -0.0293 0.0057 -0.0094 -0.0291 -0.0413 -0.0208 -0.0126 -0.0460 -0.0232 -0.0088 0.0063 -0.0167 -0.0182 -0.0076 -0.0372 0.0044 5580
Signif. (1%) 23 36 19 32 18 30 13 34 15 8 36 13 12 17 29
Positive 3 36 18 2 6 0 0 1 0 1 36 0 1 11 3  
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TABLE III 
Matched Samples 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the matched samples of ordinary trades and trades revealing the presence of hidden volume resulting from 
the matching procedure described in footnote #12. The table reports the average trade size (standard deviation in parenthesis) the number of matched 
observations for the seven trade-size percentile categories S1-S7: less than 25% (S1), 25-50% (S2), 50-75% (S3), 75-90% (S4), 90-95% (S5), 95-99% 
(S6) and greater than 99% (S7). We also report the proportion all trades executed against hidden volume that passed the filters described in footnote 
#12 that become matched. The first panel provides the results when a 1-minute pre-trade interval is used to do the matching and the second panel 
provides the results when a five-minute pre-trade interval is used. BIT (SIT) stands for buyer (seller) initiated trades. 
1 minute-matching S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Hidden BIT Avg. Size 96.74 325.13 770.78 1911.26 3163.22 6725.89 33491.87
(63.6) (210.2) (640.0) (1727.8) (2744.0) (6147.6) (49817.0)
No Hidden BIT Avg. Size 90.90 289.80 726.16 1881.28 3246.10 6906.07 51333.46
(63.2) (200.2) (629.4) (1800.2) (2872.5) (6296.4) (176309.7)
Obs. 7122 11418 18066 12478 3302 2699 394
% matched (85.5) (88.6) (88.5) (80.8) (60.3) (54.1) (35.8)
Hidden SIT Avg. Size 86.59 241.67 559.91 1525.48 3065.51 6364.15 35324.54
(58.5) (127.2) (336.8) (1146.3) (2162.3) (4817.3) (69741.9)
No Hidden SIT Avg. Size 78.17 219.51 539.90 1502.63 3163.88 6401.08 39591.32
(56.4) (128.8) (339.9) (1088.8) (2171.6) (4633.6) (73194.3)
Obs. 7836 10053 18153 14562 3902 3485 473
% matched (92.1) (91.0) (90.5) (84.5) (65.8) (65.0) (39.0)
5 minutes-matching
Hidden BIT Avg. Size 96.88 323.98 763.40 1869.42 3111.67 6504.93 33696.39
(63.5) (208.9) (631.0) (1688.7) (2636.1) (5991.2) (64833.9)
No Hidden BIT Avg. Size 88.54 292.03 716.39 1846.42 3233.14 6590.25 37714.01
(64.0) (202.0) (617.2) (1776.5) (2834.4) (6061.8) (75450.0)
Obs. 6803 10334 16486 10723 2418 1989 203
% matched (81.6) (80.2) (80.7) (69.4) (44.1) (39.8) (18.5)
Hidden SIT Avg. Size 86.25 243.03 558.74 1518.58 3001.48 6161.47 29847.45
(58.4) (127.7) (336.4) (1141.1) (2157.7) (4753.3) (39867.4)
No Hidden SIT Avg. Size 79.10 220.81 536.68 1497.48 3143.37 6159.03 35542.13
(58.1) (129.1) (340.1) (1080.5) (2168.2) (4584.9) (54563.7)
Obs. 7181 9204 16661 12718 2902 2458 218
% matched (84.4) (83.3) (83.0) (73.8) (49.0) (45.8) (18.0)
Size cathegory
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TABLE IV 
Liquidity and order flow 
This table summarizes the impact of hidden volume on liquidity and the order flow when its presence is revealed to the market. Liquidity is measured by the bid-ask spread (SPR) and the net limit order book depth 
(ND1+ND25). The order flow is characterized by the net share volume (NV), the net number of trades (NT) and the net number of limit order submitted (NLOIQ+NLOBQ+NLO). For a detailed description of these 
variables see section 6. The table reports the results for the S4 trade size category, that is, trades with size between the 75% and 90% percentiles of the trade-size empirical distribution of the corresponding stock. We 
have constructed 1000 subsamples of  matched trades randomly extracted from the samples described in Table III.  This table reports the percentage of subsamples for which the median of the corresponding variable 
for the ordinary trades is found to be statistically different at the 1% level to the median of the matched trades revealing hidden volume. We also provide the percentage of subsamples for which the null is rejected 
against the alternative that the median of the variable for the trades revealing hidden volume is larger than the median for the matched ordinary trades. We report the results for the ten-minute interval centered on the 
execution of the trades. To test the equality of medians we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. Trades are matched using the one-minute pre-trade interval (for further details on the matching procedure, see 
footnote #12).  
Ask side of the book Bid side of the book
Spread T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Rejections at 1% 1.20 1.10 1.40 1.30 1.30 75.40 58.90 57.10 42.60 31.80 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.70 1.31 55.20 38.90 35.00 21.30 21.42
Hidden > No Hidden at 1% 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.20 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Net depth T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Rejections at 1% 1.20 0.60 1.10 1.30 2.30 0.60 1.40 0.30 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.10 0.80 0.50 0.40 0.60
Hidden > No Hidden at 1% 0.90 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.50 1.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.80 1.10 0.70 0.30 0.20 0.40
Net share volume T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Rejections at 1% 1.30 1.50 3.81 1.10 3.70 79.20 5.12 14.50 6.91 8.01 0.70 1.50 1.30 1.40 6.41 53.20 17.92 8.70 4.80 3.41
Hidden > No Hidden at 1% 0.50 1.10 0.10 0.30 3.60 79.20 5.12 14.50 6.91 7.91 0.00 1.10 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
Net number of trades T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Rejections at 1% 1.80 0.60 1.61 0.90 10.80 83.50 16.53 21.66 8.41 39.90 1.41 2.61 4.11 1.51 3.02 65.50 4.31 1.10 0.90 1.00
Hidden > No Hidden at 1% 1.40 0.10 0.10 0.70 10.80 83.50 16.53 21.66 8.41 39.90 1.00 2.61 4.01 1.51 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.30
Net number of limit orders T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Rejections at 1% 4.71 3.81 1.50 1.70 6.31 0.80 1.11 0.90 1.71 0.81 2.61 7.12 2.21 2.01 21.00 0.70 1.21 0.91 2.20 1.81
Hidden > No Hidden at 1% 4.71 3.81 1.30 1.60 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.91 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.91 21.00 0.70 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.20
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TABLE V 
Returns and volatility 
This table summarizes the impact of hidden volume on returns and volatility when its presence is revealed to the market. We compute the 
cumulative mid-quote returns (CMR) and the mid-quote volatility (QV) 5, 10 and 30 minutes after the trade and until the closing of the 
trading session. For a detailed description of these variables see section 6. We have constructed 1000 subsamples of  matched trades 
randomly extracted from the samples described in Table III. This table reports the percentage of subsamples for which the median of the 
corresponding variable for the ordinary trades is found to be statistically different at the 1% level to the median of the matched trades 
revealing hidden volume. We also provide the percentage of subsamples for which the null is rejected against the alternative that the median 
of the variable for the trades revealing hidden volume is larger than the median for the matched ordinary trades. To test the equality of 
medians we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. Trades are matched using the one-minute pre-trade interval (for further details on the 
matching procedure, see footnote #12).  
Panel A: Returns
Size category Ask side of the book Bid side of the book
S1 t+5 t+10 t+30 Closing t+5 t+10 t+30 Closing 
Rejections (1% lev.) 1.10 1.40 1.10 3.10 3.21 2.20 0.90 2.60
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.30 3.00 0.00 0.40 0.50 2.60
S2
Rejections (1% lev.) 0.70 1.40 1.70 2.60 1.10 1.20 1.60 2.30
Hidden > No Hidden 0.60 1.30 1.50 2.50 0.80 1.00 1.50 2.30
S3
Rejections (1% lev.) 2.60 3.61 5.90 14.90 1.50 3.40 5.40 13.90
Hidden > No Hidden 2.60 3.61 5.80 14.90 1.20 3.40 5.40 13.90
S4
Rejections (1% lev.) 2.21 1.30 1.00 1.00 2.71 2.20 0.50 1.00
Hidden > No Hidden 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.70 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.40
S5
Rejections (1% lev.) 1.90 1.80 1.30 9.70 1.30 1.40 1.20 9.90
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.10 1.10 9.70 0.00 0.10 0.90 9.90
S6
Rejections (1% lev.) 1.70 2.11 2.40 6.70 3.21 1.50 1.31 3.90
Hidden > No Hidden 1.70 1.31 2.10 6.70 2.81 0.90 0.90 3.90
Panel B: Volatility
Size category Ask side of the book Bid side of the book
S1 t+5 t+10 t+30 Closing t+5 t+10 t+30 Closing 
Rejections (1% lev.) 1.00 1.30 1.10 15.30 1.70 1.10 1.10 13.70
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.10 0.40 15.30 0.20 0.40 0.50 13.70
S2
Rejections (1% lev.) 5.10 1.50 0.50 19.60 4.60 1.10 1.00 19.80
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.20 19.60 0.00 0.00 0.20 19.80
S3
Rejections (1% lev.) 21.80 18.30 6.90 2.00 22.90 17.90 6.50 2.90
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90
S4
Rejections (1% lev.) 35.30 15.80 7.70 2.70 31.30 13.60 6.70 3.20
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20
S5
Rejections (1% lev.) 18.50 5.50 4.30 2.00 17.20 3.60 2.80 2.00
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.90 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.90
S6
Rejections (1% lev.) 25.80 14.00 6.00 5.90 22.50 12.90 5.10 5.00
Hidden > No Hidden 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00  
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FIGURE 1 
Intra-daily Patterns 
This figure provides the average intra-daily distribution of hidden order detection compared with liquidity, trading activity and volatility. The 
continuous trading session of the SSE (from 9:00 a.m. to 17:30 p.m.) is divided into seventeen 30-minutes intervals. For each interval we 
compute the number of trades comprising hidden orders, the time-weighted average bid-ask spread, the time-weighed average cumulative 
depth at the five best ask and bid quotes, the number of shares executed (volume) and the number of trades completed. Volatility is the ratio 
between the highest and the lowest quote midpoint in each interval minus one. We represent the equally weighted average of these measures 
normalized and standardized for the 36 stocks in the sample. For normalization and standardization details see section 5.     
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FIGURE 2 
Proportion of trades involving hidden volume 
This figure provides median for the 36 stocks in the sample of the percentage of trades completed against the undisclosed side of the quoted 
depth. The continuous trading session of the SSE (from 9:00 a.m. to 17:30 p.m.) is divided into seventeen 30-minutes intervals.     
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FIGURE 3 
The intra-daily contribution of hidden orders conditional on trade size 
This figure provides the average intra-daily distribution of hidden order detection conditional on each firm’s trade size distribution. The 
continuous trading session of the SSE (from 9:00 a.m. to 17:30 p.m.) is divided into seventeen 30-minutes intervals. For each firm, trades are 
partitioned into seven percentile categories: les than 25% (S1), 25-50% (S2), 50-75% (S3), 75-90% (S4), 90-95% (S5), 95-99% (S6) and 
greater than 99% (S7). The cut-offs are also different for buyer and seller initiated trades. For each interval we compute the number of trades 
in each trade size category comprising hidden orders. We represent the equally weighted average of these measures normalized and 
standardized for the 36 stocks in the sample. For normalization and standardization details see section 5.     
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